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ABSTRACT 
Basic to traditional pianning is a centralist concept of society and ~o~itica[ decision makings 
and resource allocation ought to be guided by an activity’s comparative impact on col~ecfive 
weI@are. This paper shows that these traditional premises do not stand up to critical analysis. 
Society should be viewed as an arena where multiple parties (subsystems) convene in pursuit 
ofparticular interests, in necessary interaction with each other. Participation therewith ceases 
to be a soft issue, and proves to be a basic ingredient in resource allocation. Tied in with the 
traditional planning premises is the notion that project selection is normally neutral vis-ci-vis 
the availability of investment resources. In the concept of a multisystem society as opposed 
to a centralist society, nonneutrality in this respect or nonfungibility of investment resources 
becomes an important issue in project appraisal. 
INTRODUCTION 
The collective interest or welfare of a society is featured 
as a key issue in most existing theory on project ap- 
praisal and planning. Priorities between projects and 
between alternative project configurations are held to 
depend ideally on their relative contribution to collec- 
tive welfare. This paper opposes this traditional view. 
It argues that the collective interest cannot be defined 
unequivocally, and has, therefore, little role to play in 
resource allocation. This position follows from point- 
ing out that society is essentially an arena where mul- 
tiple parties convene, each in pursuit of particular 
interests, in unavoidable interaction with other parties’ 
particular interests. Society is identified as an entity of 
interacting subsystems. 
The paradigm of multisystem society has far-reaching 
and multifaceted consequences. This paper concentrates 
on the consequences for project appraisal and pIanning. 
Within this limitation two issues are examined: 
1. Over the last two decades the plea for parf~ci~at~~n 
has increasingly gained momentum. Participation, 
long viewed in traditional planning as a soft issue, 
seems these days to have reached firmer ground.’ It 
will be shown later that the multisystem concept of 
society identifies participation as an organic part of 
resource allocation, as a matter of fact rather than 
normatively. 
2. The selection of projects and a project’s ultimate 
configuration are traditionally held to concern choice 
that is normally neutral vis-8-vis the availability of 
investment resources. Nonnormal conditions in this 
respect are considered rare indeed, and have drawn 
little attention in the literature. This paper argues 
that nonneutrality of project choice with respect o 
resource availability is a point of considerable im- 
portance as soon as one accepts the concept of a 
multisystem society. The opposite, traditional point 
of view, it is argued, is deeply embedded in the tra- 
ditional concept of a naturally homogeneous and 
centralist society guided by the pursuit of a collec- 
tive interest in allocating its resources. 
These two issues have been singled out for discussion 
in this paper, first, because of their importance to proj- 
ect planning, and second, because they cannot be ac- 
commodated within the existing framework for project 
appraisal and planning.2 
The next section of the paper discusses the two op- 
posing concepts of society. The case for participation, 
inherent with the concept of multisystem society, is dis- 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Willem H. van den Toorn, Euroconsult, Beaulieustraat 22, P.O. Box 441, 6800 AK Arnhem, The 
Netherlands. 
22.5 
226 w. H. VAN DEN TOORN 
cussed thereafter. This is followed by investigating the resources. The paper finishes by summarizing some key 
importance to be attached to the phenomenon of non- end-products required from project appraisal under 
neutrality of project choice vis-a-vis resource availabil- multisystem society conditions. 
ity commonly known as nonfungibility of investment 
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 
The Centralist Society in Traditional Planning 
The traditional concepts of planning take a centralist 
view of both society and the processes of political de- 
cision making. In a strict hierarchy of decision making, 
the lower levels are expected to act, as it were, purely 
on the strength of delegation from above. Their deci- 
sions, ideal!y, reflect precisely the aggregate national 
objective function. What is required, in these views, for 
decision making on resource allocation to be efficient 
and successful is a great deal of coordination. This view 
has been stressed on many occasions by Tinbergen, per- 
haps the most authoritative writer in the traditional vein 
on the organization of economic policy, and many 
other writers in this field support these views (e.g., Alt- 
shuler, 1973; Blitzer, 1975; Frisch, 1976a, 1976b; Seers, 
1972; Watanabe, 1975). Centralist society is also emi- 
nently present in the literature on project planning and 
appraisal, though usually implicitly. The degree of per- 
vasiveness attributed to central authority does vary, but 
basic and common to all these views are the following 
three main features. 
1. In traditional planning theory, central authority is 
considered the ultimate decider located at the top of 
a strict hierarchy of decision making. It has suffi- 
cient power at its disposal to make lower levels ac- 
cept and execute its decisions. It also has the moral 
right and, even, obligation to do this, since tradi- 
tional planning theory regards it as the guardian of 
social well-being and of the collective interest. Thus 
the decisions of central authority acquire moral 
precedence over lower-level decisions, as the latter 
can only represent particular interests. 
2. Implicit in traditional planning concepts is a notion 
that planning must be socially efficient, while so- 
cially efficient planning seems to be defined as the 
maximization of the satisfaction of central author- 
ity’s objectives. Any decision making outside the 
boundaries of strict top-down delegation is consid- 
ered a deplorable diversion, favouring particular in- 
terests at the expense of the collective interest. In the 
unfortunate event, therefore, of central authority 
not being capable of preventing such diversions, 
losses occur in terms of potential social plan effi- 
ciency (Tinbergen, 1964, p. 221). 
3. As an implication of the first two features, a great 
deal of emphasis is put on the necessity for central 
authority to coordinate lower-level decisions, using 
the argument that “there is rarely, if ever, complete 
mutuality of interests among them” (Blitzer, 1975, 
p. 5). What is sometimes called consensus decision 
making maximizes in this view the satisfaction of the 
collective interest, constrained by the unfortunate oc- 
currence of differently directed particular interests. 
The collective interest, in turn, “is the interest of the 
nation as understood by the government of the day” 
(Wiarda, quoted in Kuin, 1982, p. 8). Incomplete 
mutuality of interests is thus not viewed as a funda- 
mental fact of life: it is considered rather to be a 
regrettable situation which central authority must as 
it were coordinate away as much as possible in or- 
der for decisions on resource allocation to toe the 
line of the collective interest. 
Multisystem Society 
The collective interest appears on reflection to be a less 
clear-cut and self-evident phenomenon than traditional 
planning theory takes it to be. Traditional planning, it 
would seem, subscribes to the idea that the collective in- 
terest can be defined unambiguously, provided that it 
is central authority undertaking to do so. Collective in- 
terest thus appears as something potentially objective, 
conditional only upon whether or not a particular body 
is responsible for its formulation. But ever since Max 
Weber, we have known that any scientific research is 
subjective-bound: to contribute to the generation of 
w&e-free knowledge, scientists should state their value 
systems when reporting on their research (see for in- 
stance Gerth & Mills, 1946). The operationalization of 
the collective interest as a notion to guide the formu- 
lation of economic policy cannot escape subjective- 
boundness, and will always reflect a particular rather 
than a collective or universal viewpoint.’ With even the 
best will in the world this is unavoidable. A penetrat- 
ing discourse in this connection is given by Kleerekoper 
(1963), who identifies the existence of a collective in- 
terest as a fiction, logically and philosophically as well 
as from the point of view of policy formulation and 
analysis. His arguments can be summarized as follows: 
1. Collective interest is not a particular interest. 
2. Collective interest is not the addition of many par- 
ticular interests, for these cannot be added. 
3. Collective interest cannot easily be explained as de- 
rived from a certain form of society, for a society is 
defined by the organization of its cells, while the 
desired form of organization must conform with the 
collective interest of that society. 
4. Collective interest cannot be the interest of a society 
abstracted from all the particular interests, for noth- 
ing would be left any longer if that were done. 
Therefore, whenever formulated, a society’s collec- 
tive interest abstracts from some particular interests 
but not from others. 
5. This raises the twin questions as to which particular 
interests are rejected (or retained) and who makes 
this decision. As to the latter, this is normally held 
to be a national government. Corresponding with 
this, and to answer the former, the interest paraded 
as collective is the particular interest of, usually, 
a national government whose views on the de- 
sired structure of the national society concerned it 
represents. 
Collective interest is thus unmasked as a decoy, 
although it is averred by governments to be the light to 
guide and justify the formulation of economic and so- 
cial policy. It is a notion used as an instrument of per- 
suasion rather than an intrinsically tenable notion 
representing what it is popularly supposed to represent. 
Invoking collective interest to further a particular in- 
terest is a strategy that can only be employed by a 
power which is already substantial and recognized as 
such. We are dealing here with the power of power to 
entrench itself ever deeper in the processes of resource 
allocation, including the allocation of political power. 
The persuasiveness of collective interest as an instru- 
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ment, and the access of governments (or, occasionally, 
other powerful bodies) to this instrument derives from 
its moral appeal. This moral appeal, in turn, is rooted 
in (a) the belief that the power to rule us is from 
heavenly descent, and (b) our feeling at ease with a 
fatherly authority that knows what is good for us and 
is capable of delivering whatever care goes with it. 
In consideration of this, we are forced to admit that 
if the collective interest is to be interpreted as the rep- 
resentation of what is good for the collectivity, it has lit- 
tle to offer to the formulation of economic and social 
policy. This means that the monolithic centralist soci- 
ety of traditional planning theory becomes an untena- 
ble proposition, and is revealed as a naive assumption 
rather than as a deliberate and well researched structure 
of society. Society, instead, appears rather to be deeply 
diversified and characterized by an intricate and com- 
plex pattern of internal interrelationships. One concept 
which may accommodate the objections raised above 
against traditional planning theory with respect to the 
structure of society and political decision making iden- 
tifies society as an entity of interactive subsystems. The 
subsystems interact because the pursuit of their partic- 
ular interest requires them to cooperate and, therefore, 
to negotiate with other subsystems which pursue their 
own particular interests. The nature of this interaction 
and the unequal power relationships are discussed in the 
next two sections. 
MULTISYSTEM SOCIETY AND PARTICIPATION 
The specific configuration - and later operation - of 
any given action or project will reflect the effective 
power relationships between the subsystems involved in 
the design and operation of the action, and the partic- 
ular interests pursued by them. Relative effective power, 
though, is not an immutable given. A subsystem may 
be forced by other subsystems involved to deviate from 
what it in fact views as the optimal solution or config- 
uration. In that event, the subsystem concerned will 
weigh the desirability of going ahead with the now 
suboptimal activity against the inherent reduction in ob- 
jective satisfaction. The greater the reduction, the 
greater the reluctance of the subsystem to remain in- 
volved. The more the configuration of the action or 
project threatens to violate a subsystem’s acceptance 
boundaries, the more a subsystem can be expected to 
muster countervailing power. 
Given the resources and networks that a subsystem 
can call upon, the relative effective power it will exer- 
cise is, therefore, a function of the trade-offs involved. 
Such trade-offs are not limited to those that would pre- 
vail in the situation where the other subsystems are as- 
sumed to stand by in benevolent neutrality.They equally 
include those connected with retaliatory action likely to 
be taken by the other subsystems if the subsystem con- 
cerned were to refuse a particular solution. A sub- 
system’s countervailing power might be sufficient to 
reach an acceptable configuration of the action or proj- 
ect at hand. However, it also might not, in which case 
the subsystem will likely fight the unacceptable solution 
with the effective means at its disposal. These means 
may be formal or informal, active or passive. In many 
cases, such a situation will ultimately lead to failure of 
the project from the point of view of the initiator(s), a 
failure which at the same time signals success to the 
refusing subsystem(s). To illustrate this, consider an in- 
itiative by central government to transform small-scale 
farming in a certain area. The reasons behind this in- 
itiative derive from central government’s objectives and 
the options it has available for action. Apart from cen- 
tral government, however, other subsystems will be crit- 
ically involved in the project, notably the small farmers. 
The objectives pursued, the resources available and the 
resource employment opportunities at hand will be dif- 
ferent for each subsystem. As a result, the optimal con- 
figuration of the project will normally vary with the 
subsystem according to the viewpoint from which the 
project is appraised. For the project to be viable, a 
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compromise configuration will have to be established. 
Such a compromise solution must remain within the ac- 
ceptance boundaries of all subsystems involved, while 
at the same time offering sufficient reward to each sub- 
system to proceed with the project. If central govern- 
ment were to push too hard, these conditions may be 
violated to the extent of leaving important characteris- 
tics of the subsystem of small-scale farming inadequately 
accounted for in the design of the project that the gov- 
ernment intends to field. This would force the farmers 
to find means of obstruction so as to prevent being 
dragged into a project they do not want. If the trade- 
offs involved are modest, the farmers might respond 
passively by failing to cooperate, but if the trade-offs 
touch at the heart of the farmers’ survival system, the 
response is likely to be far more active and even violent. 
Subsystems should not be confused with classes. 
Class generally refers to large social groupings of more 
or less permanent existence. In the concept of mul- 
tisystem society, subsystem is reserved for the smaller 
and more precise condition of a critical involvement 
with a specific (inter)action. The subsystems of society 
are therefore volatile. They come into being in precise 
connection with an emerging issue, action or project. 
They dissolve again once the issue is settled. For in- 
stance, if the pavement of a street has to be broken up, 
and there is still a choice as to whether it be this or the 
other side, this and the other side will be subsystems of 
society in connection with the pavement project. They 
cease being subsystems once the project is over and 
done with, although they may emerge again as sub- 
systems to some other project. 
Even under totalitarian conditions, society is frag- 
mented by conflicting interests and competing opinions. 
These fragments or subsystems are at the same time 
condemned to coexistence and mutual interaction. The 
importance of the administrative structure is in the 
provision-with regard to both nature and quantity- 
of (a) the channels by which particular interests are 
communicated; (b) the units that are given formal voice; 
and (c)the relationships among these units. If these pro- 
visions are few or otherwise inadequate, the differences 
in interest are likely to translate themselves into tensions 
that may be amorphous yet deeply entrenched in society. 
As a retaliation, such tensions may induce serious and 
widespread repression. 
In the concept of a multisystem society, comprehen- 
sive project appraisal would deal with a project from 
the point of view of each major subsystem involved. By 
scanning the various alternatives, the appraisal would 
yield, for each major subsystem, the formal optimal 
project configuration and an insight into the subsys- 
tem’s trade-offs connected with less attractive solutions. 
During the-implicit or explicit - intersubsystem search 
for a viable compromise solution, each subsystem will 
negotiate and muster effective power in accordance 
with both the nature of the subsystem involved and the 
severity of the trade-offs. The cohesive ingredients of 
multisystem society are thus particular and mutual in- 
terests. At no point “can one discern a process which 
transcends mutual interests into general interest. Gov- 
ernment, in this optique, is only one of society’s subsys- 
tems, though often an initiating one” (van den Toorn, 
1984, p, 4-14).4 
PROJECT SELECTION AND THE AVAILABILITY AND COSTS 
OF INVESTMENT RESOURCES 
Fungible and Nonfun~ible Resources 
The discussion of fungibility versus nonfungibility of 
investment resources in this section is generic, and con- 
cerns an unspecified single subsystem. 
Suppose a common situation in which a number of 
projects compete for a resource the availability of which 
is insufficient to permit their simultaneous implemen- 
tation. Suppose, further, that this resource is perfectly 
transferable between the projects concerned and can be 
employed in any project. As projects are selected for 
implementation and register their resource claim, the re- 
source involved will be gradually exhausted until it is 
used up. Project selection under these conditions deter- 
mines which projects will be in and which will be out. 
It serves to localize the precise allocation of the re- 
sources concerned, while affecting neither their avail- 
ability nor their cost. This situation is generally known 
as a condition of scarce and fungible resources, with 
scarce indicating the limited availability of the resources 
relative to demand, and fu~g~ble indicating their trans- 
ferability between the projects considered. The employ- 
ment of such resources in a project always implies an 
equivalent diversion away from other potential use. 
Their cost to the project concerned is therefore equal to 
the value of the alternative use foregone, and is charged 
at the time when the resources are used in the project. 
Investment resources are, however, not always trans- 
ferable between projects, Either their availability or the 
time at which they are available or their cost may be 
specifically tied to one or more projects. This situation 
is generally known as a condition of nonfungible or 
project-tied resources. The World Bank makes a useful 
distinction between two types of nonfungibility or tied- 
ness with respect to resources of foreign origin: 
l partially tied resources: in this case, the foreign fac- 
tors used in a project would be available for other 
uses but not at the same terms as in the project; 
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l tied resources: in this case, the foreign factors would 
not be available for other uses (World Bank, 1980, p. 
4). 
The use of nonfungible or project-tied resources does 
not imply forgoing their alternative use elsewhere, as is 
the case with fungible resources. When the nonfungible 
resources are required in the project, they are made 
available from sources external to the economy con- 
cerned. They are thus additional to the availability of 
the resources involved without the project, and are not 
obtained from sacrificing their useful employment else- 
where in the economy. Consequently, the cost to be 
charged to the project in connection with the use of 
nonfungible resources “is not the purchase price now, 
but the interest on and the repayment of the loan, 
which will arise only later” (Little & Mirrlees, 1974, p. 
176). 
The cost of nonfungible resources is thus determined 
by the precise terms of the contract under which they 
are acquired. A time stream of interest payments, prin- 
cipal repayments, and other charges appears in the 
project appraisal in lieu of entering the resources ac- 
cording to the time they are used in the project as would 
be the procedure in the case of fungible resources. 
The Importance of the Fungibility 
and Nonfungibility Issue 
The literature on project planning and appraisal has 
paid little attention to the problems connected with 
nonfungible resources. Whenever the reasons are made 
explicit, it is usually argued that a single project does 
not normally influence the total availability of invest- 
ment resources. For example, in connection with proj- 
ect funding from taxes and domestic borrowing, Little 
and Mirrlees (1974, p. 176) conclude that “it would be 
rare for the project evaluator to have to worry about 
these complications [nonfungibility] because we think 
that it can be reasonably assumed in almost all cases 
that one particular project will not affect total taxation 
or borrowing.” In the same vein, the World Bank 
(1980, p. 4) instructs its project evaluators that “loans 
or credits from the Bank or other international or offi- 
cial donors are . . . always considered to be untied 
resources. ”
At the level of a national economy, nonfungibility 
will indeed be the rare phenomenon that the literature 
on project planning takes it to be, since a national econ- 
omy is a comparatively large, widely diversified, and 
complex entity. As a result, individual projects are nor- 
mally marginal activities, while at any time a great 
many projects are being implemented, prepared, or are 
under consideration. Fungibility of resources between 
these projects or groups of projects will be the rule in 
these conditions, nonfungibility the exception. To the 
centralist radition in planning theory and practice, the 
national economy acts as the basic frame of reference 
for project planning. Virtually all the literature on proj- 
ect planning reflects this centralist tradition (van den 
Toorn, 1984, section 7.3), which helps explain why lit- 
tle attention has been paid to the problems connected 
with the involvement of nonfungible resources. To a 
planning theory based on the concept of multisystem 
society, the subsystems of society that are critically in- 
volved with the project constitute the frame of reference 
for project planning. One of these subsystems will of- 
ten be the national economy, in which, as argued above, 
nonfungibility is indeed a rare phenomenon. At the 
same time, however, other smaller, less diversified and 
simpler subsystems will be involved. If nonfungibility 
is rare at the level of the national economy as a result 
of its relatively large size and its diversity and complex- 
ity, the reverse equally holds true: the smaller, less 
diversified and simpler the subsystem from the point of 
view of which a project is appraised, the greater the 
likelihood and the significance of the involvement of 
nonfungible resources. It is unlikely, for example, that 
project choice within a farming system is neutral vis-a- 
vis the availability of some critical resources in the 
system. 
The conclusion must necessarily be that, when one ex- 
changes the traditional centralist concept of society for 
a planning theory based on the concept of multisystem 
society, the importance of the fungibility issue increases 
appreciably. From the viewpoint of smaller subsystems 
in particular, nonfungible investment resources will of- 
ten be involved in project development. Nonfungibility 
thus becomes an organic point of attention-certainly 
to the planning analyst and the decision maker in smaller 
subsystems-but also at the level of the large national 
(or government) subsystem of society. For if indeed 
participation and subsystems critically determine proj- 
ect configuration, profitability and selection, the trade- 
offs in any particular subsystem matter to all the other 
subsystems involved in the project, including the na- 
tional subsystem. 
Nonfungibility and Participation: An Illustration 
To clarify further some of the above and to link the 
fungibility issue to participation in multisystem society, 
let us return to the case in which a central government 
undertakes to transform small-scale farming in a certain 
area. Development funds will be a resource required in 
the project, from the points of view of both the na- 
tional economy and the small farmers. 
To the national economy, the total availability of in- 
vestment funds is unlikely to change whether the proj- 
ect is implemented or not. The project will just divert 
the funds it requires from their use elsewhere in the 
economy. Always supposing that the central govern- 
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ment’s decision to initiate the project is rational from 
the economic point of view of the national subsystem, 
the project will be expected to yield a surplus of benefits 
over costs, with the funds involved charged in ac- 
cordance with the benefits foregone elsewhere in the 
subsystem. 
To the small farmers though, the situation is likely to 
be different. Small farmers notoriously suffer from 
poor access to capital markets. It is therefore quite con- 
ceivable that the small farmer subsystem’s access to in- 
vestment resources is critically determined by project 
choice: opting to take part in the project, that is, to 
cooperate with the national subsystem, is quite likely to 
alter the small farmers’ access to investment funds, 
either in terms of volume or costs or other key aspects 
of finance such as collateral, or any combination of 
these. To the small farmers therefore, a substantial part 
of the funding must be considered nonfungible, and 
should be valued accordingly. The small farmers would 
not perhaps understand the terminology we use here, 
nor indeed apply the economic arithmetic of standard 
project planning and appraisal techniques. At the same 
time, however, the small farmers will be keenly aware 
of the opportunities and risks involved in connection 
with the project. They will intuitively recognize the 
nonfungibility of the funding resources on offer and 
(intuitively) appraise the project accordingly. Their ap- 
preciation of the power relationships involved will al- 
low them to assess the effective power and means they 
should be able to bring to bear on the intersubsystem 
negotiations that will fohow. 
Empirical evidence bears out the above. Development 
Alternatives (1980) report that the degree of participa- 
tion by the parties critically involved in the design and 
operation of rura1 development projects is highly and 
positively correlated with the successful implementation 
of such projects. Government planners and decision 
makers the world over have been disagreeably surprised 
on numerous occasions by unanticipated negative deci- 
sions reached by their target groups. Such decisions are 
communicated to the national subsystem as disappoint- 
ing project adoption rates, sabotage, and slow progress 
generally. It is conceivable, and even likely, that the de- 
cision makers and their staff in the initiating (often na- 
tional) subsystem have been disappointed due to their 
failure (a) to recognize ~~rf~c~~~tion as a hard ingre- 
dient to project design and resource allocation, and (b) 
to recognize that nonfungibifity and its consequences 
often play an important role in “project appraisal” in 
the smaller and usually not so articulate subsystems of 
society. 
Measuring and Valuing Nonfungibility 
Economically, resource costs will normally differ ac- 
cording to whether the resources concerned are fungi- 
ble or nonfungible. Unless the resource costs are higher 
under nonfungible than under fungible conditions, 
which is rare, the involvement of nonfungible invest- 
ment resources will raise net project returns compared 
with the same project under fungible conditions. This 
is sufficient reason to caution against exalted assump- 
tions of nonfungibility, because “there is a clear danger 
of approving an otherwise [economically] unacceptable 
project on the basis of an erroneous judgment that con- 
cessionary funds for the project would not be available 
for other purposes in the host country” (World Bank, 
1980). 
Besides the justified fear that intrinsically unaccept- 
able projects can be artificially made to look attractive 
by exalted assumptions of nonfungibility (see World 
Bank, 1980), there is a difficult problem of measure- 
ment involved. Projects are often interlinked in several 
and not always tangible ways. In addition, complex po- 
litical and economic interrelationships often exist with 
respect to the sources of investment resources. The ex- 
tent to which the availability of a particular resource 
would change as a result of selecting one project instead 
of another is under these conditions a hard question to 
answer. To answer this question one should be able to 
estimate reasonably accurately (a) the availability of 
the resource concerned over time with and without 
the project under consideration, and (b) the terms on 
which the resources would be available under these two 
conditions. 
For large and diversified subsystems in particular, 
these estimation problems will be considerable indeed 
and sheer speculation will not always be avoidable. 
Measuring the involvement of nonfungible resources in 
these cases tends to boil down to the analyst indicating 
(a} whether nonfungibiIity plays a part; (b) which 
resources are involved; and (c) the order of magnitude 
of nonfungibility of a particular resource. As regards 
the valuation of nonfungible resources, similar indica- 
tions are usually possible, but in both instances better 
estimates will normally be unobtainable. In actual 
cases, which, as said, are rare, testing the stability of 
priority ranking and of the absolute profitability of the 
projects concerned for a reasonable range of different 
proportions of nonfungibility will have more practicai 
value than a great effort to produce a single figure.s 
In smaller and less diversified subsystems, measuring 
and valuing nonfungibility of investment resources is 
likely to be rather more manageable than in the large 
and complex subsystems discussed above. It may be 
generally conjectured that, as subsystems get smaller 
and less complex, (a) nonfungibility of investment 
resources will occur more often and should receive in- 
creasing attention in project appraisal, and (b) nonfun- 
gibility of investment resources can be measured and 
valued with greater precision. 
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The concept of multisystem society as discussed in this 
paper leads to the identification of (a) participation as 
a hard-core issue in resource allocation, and (b) non- 
fungibility of investment resources as a less rare phe- 
nomenon than traditional planning takes it to be, 
particularly in smaller, not very diversified subsystems, 
The previous paragraphs, in addition, argue that par- 
ticipation should be taken seriously in project appraisal, 
more or less independently from the subsystem from 
the viewpoint of which the appraisal is primarily carried 
out. Participation and nonfungibility of investment 
resources hould be combined in project appraisal by 
indicating (a) the subsystems critically involved in the 
design or implementation and operation of a project; 
(b) the resources required in project planning, imple- 
mentation and operation specified per subsystem in- 
volved; (c) the availability of the resources concerned in 
each subsystem; (d) the estimated egree of nonfungi- 
bility of these resources and the approximate conomic 
consequences in each subsystem; and (e) the main alter- 
native development opportunities reasonably available 
in each subsystem and the main developmental trade- 
offs involved.6 
A practical problem project appraisers must be pre- 
pared to face if they conclude that nonfungible re- 
sources are involved (particularly with respect o larger 
subsystems) will be the considerable debatability of the 
assessment on the part of potential funding agencies. 
World Bank (1980) bears witness to this, as indeed does 
empirical experience in this respect .’ 
ENDNOTES 
I. See for example Development Alternatives (1980). In their evalu- 
ation of some 60 USAID projects they point to the strong corre- 
spondence between substantive participation by the parties involved 
(in design, establishment and operation) and project success (see 
also Uma Lele, 1975). 
2. Other significant implications can often be handled within this 
framework. Subsystem specificity of prices, for example, would 
not call for a new price theory. The derivation of subsystem-spe- 
cific prices could be undertaken in accordance with the measure- 
ment procedures and instructions customary in project appraisal 
from the nationaI-economic point of view. The only change re- 
quired would be to substitute the national economy for the sub- 
system concerned. An interesting consequence of the multisystem 
concept of society as far as project appraisal is concerned is the 
elimination of the odd distinction between economic and financial 
prices. In customary project appraisal, the former indicate the 
prices in the national economy, the latter those of some disag- 
gregate party to the project. The national economy represents the 
decisive point of view, whereas disaggregate parties, at the most, 
may exercise some constraining power. In the multisystem concept 
of society, a subsystem is a subsystem irrespective of the power 
relationships involved. Prices are always subsystem-specific and 
represent the scarcity relationships in the subsystem concerned. The 
need for any artificial distinction such as between “economic” and 
“financial” prices thereby disappears. 
3. Subjective-boundness of the formulation of the collective interest 
does not deny the metaphysical possibility that collective interest 
may indeed exist for mankind. It does deny, however, the possi- 
bility of an objective formulation of it. 
4. Multisystem society as opposed to the centralist society of tradi- 
tional planning theory finds support not only in the philosophi- 
cal thought of Kleerekoper, but also with political scientists (e.g. 
Bauer & Gergen, 1968; Dahl, 1976; Hoogerwerf, 1972; Leys, 1972); 
management scientists (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Simon, 1958, 1964); 
development economists (e.g. Killick, 1976; van den Toorn, 1984; 
Ill-Haq, 1976); and in evaluation studies (e.g., Development Al- 
ternatives, 1980). 
5. In some cases, a somewhat more adventurous procedure may be 
possible and useful. One such may be as follows: (a) the availability 
over time of the resource concerned is estimated alternatively with 
and withozrt the project being implemented; (b) the difference be- 
tween these two time streams is discounted at the national discount 
rate and aggregated, so as to arrive at the present value of the non- 
fungible part of the project’s claim on the resource concerned; and 
(c) the ratio of this present value to the present value of the proj- 
ect’s total claim on the resource concerned is used to compute both 
the nonfungible and the fungible part of the project’s resource 
claim for each year of the project’s investment period. Another 
possible procedure would consider the expected resource alloca- 
tions instead of the expected resource availability and otherwise 
proceed as discussed above. 
6. This paper, so far, has discussed the points raised in economic 
terms. There is, of course, the difficult issue that neither benefits 
nor costs can be expressed solely in economic terms if the appraisal, 
and particularly a multiproject appraisal, is to serve planning pof- 
icy from a multiobjective, multiresource point of view. Mufti- 
criteria appraisal, though, would not alter what is said in this paper 
about multisystem society and the twin consequences of that con- 
cept for participation and nonfungibility of investment resources. 
The application of multicriteria analysis would complicate the ap- 
praisal by, ultimately, revealing the trade-offs involved in terms 
of the multiple criteria applied. In multisystem society these cri- 
teria would be subsystem-specific. Multicriteria appraisal is a large 
chapter nowadays in management science. For multiproject pian- 
ning in developing countries (though not necessarily only in devel- 
oping countries), the author has developed a multicriteria planning 
method called “utility-based trade-off analysis” (van den Toorn, 
1985). This method has been applied successfully over the last eight 
years in a considerable number of sector studies. 
7. Some of the problems involved can be exemplified with the aid of 
a recently completed feasibility study on a substantial hydroelec- 
tric project in conjunction with an aluminium smelter in West 
Africa (Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners/Euroconsult, 1983). The 
funding agencies argued from the point of view of the international 
economy, parading the myth of the collective interest (the inter- 
national economy), while the consultant argued that three differ- 
ent subsystems were involved in the project: the national economy, 
the (international) aluminium industry, and the funding agencies. 
Nonfun~ibility of investment funds was argued by the consultant 
to be an important issue in the national economy of the country 
232 w. H. VAN DEN TOORN 
involved, with significant and positive economic consequences. The jetted the large project and the funding agencies agreed to fund 
funding agencies did not accept this, and no agreement was reached and the national economy agreed to implement a much smaller hy- 
in this respect between the consultant and the funding agencies. droelectric project without an aluminium component. 
The end of the game was that the intersubsystem negotiations re- 
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